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Abstract  This paper considers the prospects for cooperative multilateral man-
agement of the North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries in accordance with the
United Nations (UN) Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks signed in December 1995. A three-players characteristic
function game (c-game) is used to analyze the cooperative agreements. The
analysis focuses on the sharing of total net returns from cooperation. Three
sharing rules are calculated; namely, the Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and the
Nash bargaining solution. The analysis is based on simulation and optimization
results from a multi-gear, age-structured, bioeconomic model developed for the
North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, East and West stocks.
The results show, as expected, that significant gains can be attained from co-
operation. The different sharing rules for the distribution of gains provide different
returns to each player. Nonetheless, the basic transfer payments structure is rather
stable. This case study points out some particular situations where these solu-
tions are not enough to guarantee cooperation between all the coastal states.
Key words  Bluefin tuna, cooperative games, high-seas fisheries, highly migra-
tory fish stocks, Nash bargaining solution, Nucleolus, Shapley value.
Introduction
The management of highly migratory species has become one of the most important
problems in the management of ocean fisheries (Munro 1998).
Under the 1982 Law of the Sea, high seas were considered to be international
common property, being open to the fishing activities of any distant water fishing
nations. In the past decade, several examples of conflicts between fishing nations
and the severe depletion of many highly migratory fish stocks proved that this legal
setting was inadequate to deal with the sustainable management of these resources
(Munro 1998, 1999).
In an attempt to solve this problem, the UN in December 1995, signed the
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The UN
Agreement suggests that the management of highly migratory species should be car-
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ried out by a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) and that only
the nations that follow its management regime will have access to the resource.
Also, as stated in Tahindro (1999), the agreement establishes that, “Coastal States
and States fishing in the high seas are required to cooperate for the adoption of mea-
sures aimed at insuring the long term sustainability of these stocks and at promoting
the objective of their optimum utilization.”
This new setting can be interpreted as establishing a legal obligation to cooper-
ate within a RMFO; therefore, cooperative games can help us examine the econom-
ics of cooperative management. In fact, several authors have already suggested this
as an adequate framework to study the negotiation process of cooperative agree-
ments within an RFMO (Kaitala and Lindroos 1998; Li 1998; and Munro 1999).
In particular, Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) and Li (1998) used a c-game ap-
proach to study this problem. The c-game approach is based on the fundamental as-
sumption that the players have already agreed to cooperate, and that side payments
among the players are possible. The problem to be solved in this setting is the distri-
bution of the gains of cooperation in a fair way. Three solution concepts are pro-
posed as possible solutions for this problem: the Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and
the egalitarian, or Nash, bargaining solution. These solutions are based on different
fairness concepts. The Nucleolus maximizes the benefits of the coalition that present
the minimum gains, the Shapley value divides the gains in accordance to each
player’s average contribution for the coalition payoffs, and the Nash bargaining so-
lution yields an egalitarian imputation of the gains.
In the two aforementioned papers, all the solutions are in the core of the game,
so it is not clear which of these solutions will be most likely realized in practice. In
fact, different solutions will treat players differently, so that each player will favor
the solution that maximizes its payoffs.
This paper presents a case study where a c-game approach is applied to the co-
operative management of the North Atlantic bluefin tuna. For this fishery, a three
players’ game is defined. For the East stock, it is considered that all the countries
participating in the fishery are represented in the regional organization by one of the
three members, the EU (European Union), OCS (other coastal states), and DWFNs
(distant water fishing nations). For the West stock, the three members considered
are: the USA (United States), CAN (Canada), and DWFNs.
The simulation of possible outcomes of this fishery is based on a multi-gear,
age-structured, bioeconomic model developed for the North Atlantic bluefin tuna
fisheries (Pintassilgo, Brasão, and Duarte 1998). The overall fishery comprises a
number of sub-fisheries, defined geographically and by fleet/gear, operating out of
many countries. Different fishing gears target different quality and size specimens,
which also have different market values. The complexity of the bioeconomic model
used reflects most of these aspects. The optimal strategies are assumed to be fixed
strategies, either constant level of effort or constant level of catch, that maximizes
the total net present values of profits for a 25-year period.
This paper differs from the two mentioned above in two aspects. First, the
analysis is not based on a theoretical framework, but is applied to a real fishery.
Second, the players do not differ in costs (or efficiency), but in dimension and com-
position of gear structure. This case study points out one possible source of weak-
ness in the UN agreement. None of the solutions is in the core of the game, meaning
that some players can do better outside the grand coalition. This may be a serious
threat to the cooperative arrangement, and it certainly creates an incentive to cheat.
Note, however, that in the UN Agreement, it is established that nations that do not
follow the RMFO regime will not have access to the resource. This legal restriction
is, therefore, essential for increasing the effectiveness of this management solution,An Application of C-Games 23
and it can deal with the DWFNs. The possible free rider problem remains with the
coastal states, as they can always fish in their EEZ.
This paper is organized as follows. First, a brief description of the fishery is
provided, and the bioeconomic model is defined. Second, the setting and structure of
the characteristic function game is settled for the East stock. Third, the three solu-
tion concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, and egalitarian, are calculated for this
game. A similar analysis is then presented for the West stock. Finally, the main re-
sults are discussed together with the scope for further work.
The Fishery
The North Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is a paradigmatic example of the difficulties
faced in managing highly migratory species. Many countries, both coastal and dis-
tant water, capture this species in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Re-
cent stock assessments report that both the East and the West stocks are severely de-
pleted and face an acute risk of extinction.1
There exists two major spawning areas, both characterized by warm waters that
reach 24ºC. In the West Atlantic, the spawning area is in the Gulf of Mexico and in
the Florida Straits. In the East Atlantic, the spawning area is located in the Mediter-
ranean around the Balearic Islands and the southern Tyrrhenian Sea.
Bluefin tuna is distributed on the West, from Brazil to Labrador; on the East
from the Canary Islands to Norway; in the North Sea; in the Mediterranean; and in
the southern Black Sea. Occasionally, it reaches Iceland and Murmansk.
North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries are characterized by a variety of vessel
types and fishing gears operating out of many countries. Different types of fishing
gear target different quality and sizes of bluefin tuna, which have different market
values. The prices for large, high-quality specimens are significantly higher.
The most important fishing gears in the East Atlantic are: purse seine, longline,
trap, and baitboat. In the West Atlantic, the prevailing gears are: purse seine,
longline, and rod and reel. These gears differ according to the location of the fish-
ery, and differences in efficiency may also be found.
Throughout the years, the importance of each gear has changed. Certain fisher-
ies, such as traps, go back to ancient times. Other fisheries, such as the Atlantic
longline and the Mediterranean purse seine, reached full development in the mid-
1970s. The spatial distribution of the different gears in the Atlantic and the Mediter-
ranean Sea has also changed over time. One of the most relevant changes has been
the reallocation of the longline fishery, mainly Japanese, from the West to the East
Atlantic. The distribution of the main fisheries following 1970 is shown in figure 1.
The management of North Atlantic bluefin tuna falls under the aegis of the
ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas). This
Commission, created in 1969, is comprised of twenty-three fishing nations and is re-
sponsible for collecting information and proposing scientific-based management
measures. Several conservation measures have been proposed by the ICCAT in order
to preserve these stocks from a serious risk of extinction, but without much success.
The common property of high seas allowed any country to extend its fishery, mak-
ing noncooperation the natural outcome. In this setting, the individual countries in-
volved had no clear incentives to adhere to restrictive measures. This is also pre-
dicted by economic theory of shared stocks where noncooperative management re-
sults in a situation equivalent to open-access equilibrium (Kaitala and Munro 1997).
1 For a detailed description of the historical and present situation of this fishery see Costa Duarte,
Brasão, and Pintassilgo 1998.Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 24
The Model
To simulate the possible outcomes of this fishery, we use an age-structured, multi-
gear bioeconomic model developed for both the East and the West stocks. This
model is presented in Pintassilgo, Brasão, and Duarte (1998) and Pintassilgo (1999).
The model was used to simulate an open-access outcome and study the optimal use
of the resource.
The model was extended in order to obtain outcomes by nations. In this ap-
proach, it was assumed that the fishery was composed of only three members: the
EU, OCS, and DWFNs, for the East stock, and the USA, CAN, and DWFNs, for the
West stock. Taking into account that the countries involved in this fishery use more
than one type of gear, the relative importance of the three members in each sub-fish-
ery was based on the values of catches by gear and country published by the ICCAT
for the base year 1995 (ICCAT 1996). A general description of the model is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
The open-access dynamics were modeled assuming that effort changes accord-
ing to the signs of profits and a given adjustment coefficient. The optimal manage-
ment of this fishery is considered to be the constant fishing strategy for each gear
(either constant level of effort or constant level of catch) that maximizes net present
value of profits (NPV) over a 25-year period.2 It turns out that, in this setting, con-
stant effort strategies always provide higher NPV than the constant catch strategies.
Figure 1. North Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Main Fisheries (Source: ICCAT)
2 Throughout this paper, net present value of profits is calculated assuming a 4% discount rate. This dis-
count rate was considered reasonable according to other applied studies using similar investment hori-
zons, such as the “Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna” (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1995) and long-run interest rates published in FMI reports.An Application of C-Games 25
The optimal management solution in this model is much more difficult to estab-
lish than those derived from aggregated bioeconomic models. The optimal manage-
ment solution has to determine not only the optimal level of effort, but also the opti-
mal mix of gears. This is due to the fact that different gears result in different prof-
its, therefore affecting the maximum level of profits attainable by the entire fishery.
In order to assess the importance of gear structure in the optimal management solu-
tions, two scenarios are presented in Pintassilgo (1999). In one, the strategies are re-
stricted to a fixed gear structure. In the other, the strategies are unrestricted.
This paper uses the first scenario, which imposes some restriction to the optimal
management of this stock, but it is certainly a realistic base for a cooperative agree-
ment. This analysis was extended to the other scenario, but the results were not sig-
nificantly different.
The Setting of the Game
Let us consider that the actual situation of this fishery is the noncooperative out-
come, as simulated by the open-access. In this outcome, the stock of bluefin tuna is
expected to be extinct in five years, and the NPV obtained by all gears is US$7.6
million. This value is divided by the three members according to fleet activity and is
presented in the first row of table 1. The open-access simulation implies a negative
NPV for the EU and the OCS members, but a positive NPV for the DWFNs.3
The optimization routine of the model establishes that the optimal management
strategy would be a 50% effort reduction for all gears (Pintassilgo 1999).4 By doing
so, stock and catches for all gears would grow progressively throughout the entire
simulation period. The NPV accumulated in 25 years will be US$1,292 million. The
NPV earned by the fleets of three members is divided and presented in the second
row of table 1.
As can be seen, the total benefits from cooperation are very significant for all
members, but they are not evenly distributed. More than half of the profits from this
cooperative solution will be due to EU fleets. This occurs because the most profit-
able gears in the long run (trap and remainder) belong to EU fleets. In fact, the catch
function representing those gears has the highest catch-stock elasticity. Therefore, as
the stock recovers, those catches grow faster than do those harvested by the other
gear types.
Now, let us assume that an RMFO is established for the East stock and that all
three members participating in the fishery agree to cooperate. Suppose that all play-
ers agree to restrict their effort by 50% for all gears and that they have to decide
how the benefits from cooperation should be divided.
A characteristic function game approach (c-game) is then applied to this setting
in order to study the possible solution for the distribution of gains.
Following the notation used by Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), let w(X95) denote
the global economic return from this fishery under a cooperative agreement. In par-
ticular, the value reflects the NPV obtained by following the optimal management
strategy for 25 years, starting at the stock level of the base year (X95).
Let e(X95) denote the net global returns to be shared by the three members.
These are equal to the present value of the optimal management strategy, w(X95),
subtracting from it the sum of the threat points of each member. The sum of the
threat points is the NPV resulting from the noncooperative fishery.
3 The negative NPVs are due to losses that some gears experience when the stock collapses.
4 The solution used here assumes also that the total catch of the remainder is restricted to 5,000 metric tons.Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 26
e(X95) = 1,291.7 – 7.6 = US$1,284 million (1)
Let (M,v*) denote the characteristic function form of the game, where v*(K) is the
value of coalition K that measures the increase in NPV achievable with this coali-
tion, and M is the set of all possible coalitions.
Let the value of each coalition v*(K), be equal to its own payoffs less the sum of
the noncooperative payoffs of its members (Mesterton-Gibbons 1992). Also, the nor-
malized values are given by: v(K) = v*(K)/e(X95).
The set of all the possible coalitions for this game is: ({EU,OCS,DWFN},
{EU,OCS}, {EU,DWFN}, {OCS,DWFN}, {EU}, {OCS}, {DWFN}, {Ø}).
Calculating v*(K) for all coalitions requires the use of the bioeconomic model
to simulate these outcomes. The outcome of the grand coalition is the optimal man-
agement simulation outcome. Also, the coalition of each individual member gener-
ates less profit than in open-access, being v*(K) equal to 0.
To simulate the outcomes of the two-member coalitions, it was assumed that the
two members of the coalition maximize the joint NPV, assuming that the third mem-
ber is acting according to market dynamics.5 It turns out that the optimal strategy for
all coalitions is also a constant effort strategy. The optimal effort reductions for each
coalition, as well as the NPV obtained by each member, are presented in table 1.
All three possible two-player coalitions will increase NPV as compared to the
noncooperative solution. However, the greater impact occurs with the coalitions that
include the EU. Note also that the member excluded from the coalition is the one
that gains the most. This happens because the stock recovery that occurs will be
most beneficial to the member that is free to increase its own effort. Recall that in
this situation, the member that is out of the coalition is able to increase its effort
whenever there are profits. Moreover, in all the partial coalition simulations, the
stock will still be extinct before the end of the simulation period, although later than
in the open-access simulation. This means that only the grand coalition is able to
provide sustainable stock management.
Table 1 also shows that coalition {OCS, DWFN} is not able to do better than
the noncooperative case. In fact, the NPV generated by this coalition is less than the
sum of the threat points. It is then assumed that this coalition will never take place.
Table 1
Coalition Simulation Outcomes—East Stock
NPV
Strategy E/E95 NPV EU OCS DWFN Coalition
Noncooperative 7.6 –13.8 –5.0 26.4 –
Cooperative 0.50 1,291.7 727.1 337.1 227.6 1,291.7
{EU, OCS} 0.28 991.8 107.3 46.9 837.5 154.2
{EU, DWFN} 0.34 976.4 155.7 752.4 68.3 224.0
{OCS, DWFN} 0.68 19.9 5.0 –4.1 19.0 15.0
{EU} 7.6 –13.8 –5.0 26.4 –13.8
{OCS} 7.6 –13.8 –5.0 26.4 –5.0
{DWFN} 7.6 –13.8 –5.0 26.4 26.4
Note: Values of NPV in 106 USD
5 Market dynamics were defined in the bioeconomic model for the open-access simulation, increasing
effort whenever there are profits and decreasing it whenever there are losses (see Pintassilgo 1999).An Application of C-Games 27
The values of the coalitions v*(K) and the normalized values v(K) are presented in
table 2. It shows that in this game, most of the sub-coalitions have a zero value,
meaning that they are not able to do better than the noncooperative setting. Only the
two coalitions that include the EU will have a positive value.
The Solution
Suppose now that the members within the RMFO have to agree on a distribution of
benefits. The most common sharing rules used in the c-game approach (e.g., Li
1998; Kaitala and Lindroos 1998) are: the Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and the
Nash bargaining solution. All three solutions define a share imputation of the gains
Z = (Z1, Z2, Z3) that must satisfy the following conditions: (i) Zi ≥  0 (individual ratio-
nality); (ii) Z1 + Z2 + Z3 = 1 (group rationality). For the particular game structure of
this applied study, these three solutions exist and are unique.
The Sharing Rules
The idea behind the Nucleolus concept is to find a payoff vector that maximizes the
minimum gains of cooperating. Thus, the benefits of the “least satisfied coalition”
are maximized. More specifically, it maximizes the minimum gains to any possible
coalition, and can be defined as follows (Friedman 1986):
DEFINITION: For a set of imputation vectors X, the Nucleolus over X is:
Nuc (X) = {Z ∈  X Z′  ∈  X implies θ (Z) <L θ (Z′ )} (2)
where θ (Z) is the function:
θ (Z) = [θ 1(Z), θ 2(Z),…, θ 8(Z)] (3)
and




{EU, OCS, DWFN} 1,284.1 1.00
{EU, OCS} 173.1 0.14
{EU, DWFN} 211.4 0.17





Note: Values of V*(K) in 106 USDDuarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 28
here Kj represents a coalition, and Exc the excess function defined as:
Exc K Z v K Z jj i
iK j
(, ) () =−
∈
∑ (5)
The relation denoted θ (Z) < L θ (Z′ ) defines a lexicographic ordering. Under this or-
dering, θ (Z) is smaller than θ (Z′ ) if θ 1(Z) < θ 1(Z′ ) or, for j > 1, θ j(Z) < θ j(Z′ ) and
θ i(Z) = θ i(Z′ ), for i = 1,…, j – 1.
The Shapley value is based on the average contribution that each member makes
to the set of possible coalitions (Kaitala and Lindroos 1998).
DEFINITION: Let the Shapley value be the imputation Z = (Z1, Z2, Z3) given by:
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Here, K includes all the coalitions to which member i belong, M is the set of all pos-
sible coalitions, k denotes the number of elements in K, and m is the total number of
players. Also, v(K – {i}) defines the value of coalition K excluding the member i. There-
fore, [v(K) – v(K – {i})] represents the contribution of member i to the coalition K.
The Nash bargaining solution for an m player bargaining game can be defined
as follows:
DEFINITION: The Nash bargaining solution is the vector u that maximizes the Nash
product:
Π im i i d ∈ − () u (7)
where ui is the payoff of player i in the grand coalition, and di is the payoff of player
i in the case of noncooperation.
This solution yields an egalitarian imputation for all the players and completely
ignores the possibility of cooperation among subsets of players (Myerson 1991).
The Solutions
The solutions for the three sharing rules were calculated for the East Atlantic and
are presented in table 3. Each solution establishes a possible way for Regional Orga-
nization Members to agree on redistribution of the benefits from cooperation, given
by e(X95).
They show that for this particular game, the three concepts give similar imputa-
tions. The Nucleolus imputation is even equal to the Nash bargaining solution. This
is due to the low value of v(K) for all the two-member coalitions. In fact, if all the
two-player coalitions present a v(K) ≤  1/3, then the Nucleolus is equal to the Nash
bargaining solution. Thus, if the value of the two-player coalitions is not very high,
the Nucleolus approaches the egalitarian solution.
The Shapley value, reflecting the average contribution of each player in the set
of possible coalitions, gives the highest share to the EU, which is, in this sense, the
player with some bargaining power.
By comparing the gains from cooperation attributed to each member with its
NPV in the cooperative scenario, we can determine the side payments necessary for
implementing the agreement. Table 4 shows that for all three sharing rules, the coop-An Application of C-Games 29
erative agreement implies that the EU member will have to transfer to the other two
members part of the NPV generated by its own fleets. Nonetheless, these transfers de-
crease substantially by adopting the Shapley value instead of the other sharing rules.
Note that the values of the payments shown in table 4 represent the net present value of
the sum of the transfers for 25 years. Also, the distribution of the payments accord-
ing to any of the solutions will vary significantly throughout the simulation years.
Interpreting the Results
This case study points out one possible source of weakness in the UN agreement.
None of these solutions is in the core of the game, meaning that some players can do
better by free riding the grand coalition. In fact, if we compare the gains from coop-
eration attributed to “OCS” and “DWFN,” with the gains of the outcomes of the
coalitions {EU, DWFN} and {EU, OCS}, it can be seen that those members gain a
lot more if they do not participate in the grand coalition. This seems to be a serious
threat to the cooperative arrangement, and certainly creates an incentive to cheat.
Note, however, that the UN Agreement establishes that the nations that do not
follow the RMFO regime will not have access to the resource. This legal restriction
is, therefore, essential for increasing the effectiveness of this management solution,
and it can deal with the DWFNs.
The possible free rider problem remains with the coastal states. In this case, it is
not possible to prevent them from fishing this resource in their coastal waters; there-
fore, a sustainable management of the resource is more difficult to attain with a dis-
tribution of gains according to any of the three sharing rules.
As a final remark, note that this analysis is based on a complex bioeconomic
model and that the model structure and parameters determine the values presented.
Nonetheless, sensitivity and retrospective analyses of the model presented in
Brasão, Pintassilgo, and Costa Duarte (1999), shows that the optimal policies are
generally not very sensitive to the model parameters.
In the specific setting of this paper, the impact of changes in the discount rate in
the game solutions was also analyzed. Discount rate increases of 10% and 20% were
considered.
Table 3
The Sharing Rules—East Stock
EU OCS DWFN
Nucleolus 0.33 0.33 0.33
Shapley 0.38 0.30 0.32
Nash 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 4
Side Payments for the Three Solutions—East Stock
EU OCS DWFN
NPV-Coop. 727.1 337.1 227.6
Nucleolus 312.8 –85.9 –226.9
Shapley 248.7 –44.3 –204.4
Nash 312.8 –85.9 –226.9Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 30
The simulation results show that increasing the discount rate for all the players
will affect the NPV, but will not significantly affect optimal policies. Therefore, there is
a considerable impact on the gains from cooperation, but the structure of the game and
the relative position of the players is rather stable. Regarding the sharing rules, table 5
shows that for a 20% discount rate, the Nucleolus remains equal to the Nash bargaining
solution. For the Shapley value, the results show that the EU share increases with the
discount rate, while the share of the OCS, and especially the DWFNs, decreases.
It order to assess the importance of different discount rates for the players, a
scenario was considered in which the EU and the OCS have a 4% discount rate,
while the DWFN has a higher rate (20%). The results for the three sharing rules are
presented in the 4th column of table 5. In this case, the Nucleolus remains equal to
the Nash bargaining solution, but the Shapley value gives a lower share to the
DWFNs. Therefore, the player with a higher rate of discount would have a lower
share in Shapley value.
The C-Game Analysis for the West Stock Fishery
An analysis similar to the one presented in the previous section for the East stock
was also developed for the West stock. The optimal reductions in effort for each
coalition, as well as the NPV obtained by each member in that outcome, are pre-
sented in table 6.
In the noncooperative outcome, the stock would be extinct in 12 years, with a
negative NPV for all gears (Pintassilgo, Brasão, and Costa Duarte 1998).6 The opti-
mal management strategy in this case is a 24% reduction in all gears (Pintassilgo
1999).
All of the two-member coalitions will increase the NPV.7 However, the higher
gains occur with the coalitions that include the USA.
The values of each coalition are presented in table 7, and the imputation for
each of the sharing rules in table 8. As in the East case, the benefits from coopera-
tion would be redistributed among the RMFO members according to the sharing
rules. Recall that the gains from cooperation are defined as the difference between
the sum of the payoffs in the grand coalition and the noncooperative scenario.
Table 5
Impact of the Discount Rate on the Sharing Rules—East Stock
r = 4% r = 20% rDWFN = 20%
{EU, OCS, DWFN} {EU, OCS, DWFN} {EU, OCS, DWFN}
Nash {0.33, 0.33, 0.33} {0.33, 0.33, 0.33} {0.33, 0.33, 0.33}
Shapley {0.38, 0.30, 0.32} {0.43, 0.29, 0.28} {0.38, 0.31, 0.31}
Nucleolus {0.33, 0.33, 0.33} {0.33, 0.33, 0.33} {0.33, 0.33, 0.33}
6 Note that the West stock is severely depleted, but the fisheries are restricted, and actual catch and ef-
fort are at low levels. This implies that the effort in 1995 was very low, so that an open-access simula-
tion takes longer to lead the stock to extinction.
7 The sum of the net present value of the three players is higher in the case of the coalition
{USA,DWFN} than in the grand coalition, which seems to be a contradiction. Recall that the optimal
strategies in this case are restricted to constant strategies and constant shares. In the two-member coali-
tion outcomes, the third player is allowed to increase its effort gradually, introducing some additional
flexibility, which explains the higher total net present value.An Application of C-Games 31
The results of this game show some differences when compared to the East
case. The Nucleolus is significantly different from the Nash bargaining solution.
This is because there is a two-player coalition, formed by the USA and the DWFN,
that presents a high value, v(K) = 0.55. The Nucleolus is now closer to the Shapley
value, although the latter still yields a higher share for the player with the highest
bargaining power (the USA).
The side payments necessary to implement each of the proposed solutions are
presented in table 9. It can be seen that, for all the three sharing rules, the USA is a
net contributor and the DWFN a net receiver. Canada, on the other hand, is a net
receiver with the Nash bargaining solution and a net contributor with the Nucleolus
and the Shapley value.
Table 6
Coalition Simulation Outcomes—West Stock
NPV
Strategy E/E95 NPV USA CAN DWFN Coalition
Noncooperative –3.737 –1.596 –1.016 –1.125 –
Cooperative 0.76 67.271 33.978 19.947 13.346 67.271
{USA, CAN} 0.48 44.025 12.777 6.614 24.634 19.391
{USA, DWFN} 0.71 69.014 25.656 33.002 10.357 36.012
{CAN, DWFN} 0.42 19.976 15.793 2.091 2.092 4.183
{USA} –3.737 –1.596 –1.016 –1.125 –1.596
{CAN} –3.737 –1.596 –1.016 –1.125 –1.016
{DWFN} –3.737 –1.596 –1.016 –1.125 –1.125




{USA, CAN, DWFN} 71.0 1.00
{USA, CAN} 22.0 0.31
{USA, DWFN} 38.7 0.55





Note: Values of V*(K) in 106 USD
Table 8
The Sharing Rules—West Stock
USA CAN DWFN
Nucleolus 0.43 0.23 0.34
Shapley 0.45 0.22 0.33
Nash 0.33 0.33 0.33Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo 32
Also, for the West stock, none of these solutions is in the core of the game. If
we compare the gains from cooperation attributed to “CAN” and “DWFN,” with the
gains of the outcomes of the coalitions, {USA, DWFN} and {USA, CAN}, it can be
seen that those members gain a lot more if they do not participate in the grand coali-
tion. Here again, the obligation to follow the RMFO regime in order to have access
to the fishery can solve the free rider problem of the DWFNs. However, this prob-
lem remains for Canada.
Conclusions
This paper studies a possible cooperative solution for a high-seas fishery manage-
ment problem to be undertaken by a RFMO, as proposed by the 1995 UN Agree-
ment. Namely, the cooperative management of the North Atlantic bluefin tuna is
presented.
A characteristic function game (c-game) approach is applied to describe the
sharing of the benefits of cooperation. This approach assumes that the grand coali-
tion exists and that the problem lies in how benefits from cooperation should be dis-
tributed among members in a “fair” way. Three sharing rules are calculated: the
Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and the Nash bargaining solution. None of these solu-
tions is in the core of the game, meaning that it is not clear which will be most
likely realized in practice. In fact, different solutions will treat players differently,
so that each one will favor the solution that maximizes its payoffs.
In the East Atlantic, the Nucleolus is equal to the Nash bargaining solution, as
there is no coalition with considerable bargaining power. In all three sharing rules,
the cooperative agreement implies that the EU member will have to transfer part of
its returns from the fishery to the other members. These transfers decrease if the
Shapley value is adopted.
In the West Atlantic, the Nucleolus is significantly different from the Nash bar-
gaining solution, owing to the significant bargaining power of the coalition formed
by the USA and the DWFN. According to the sharing rules, the USA is a net con-
tributor and DWFN a net receiver. Concerning CAN, it is a net receiver when the
Nash bargaining solution is applied. However, it is a net contributor with the
Nucleolus and the Shapley value.
The results obtained for the two stocks illustrate some characteristics of the dif-
ferent sharing rules. The Shapley value always gives the largest share of the benefits
to the player with the highest bargaining power. This only occurs in the Nucleolus if
there is a coalition with a substantial bargaining power. Based on this argument,
Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) state that the Nucleolus may provide a more stable ba-
sis for regional cooperation since the least efficient countries receive nearly as much
of the surplus benefits as the most efficient fishing nation, when differences in effi-
ciency are not substantial.
Table 9
Side Payments for the Three Solutions—West Stock
USA CAN DWFN
NPV-Coop. 34.0 19.9 13.3
Nucleolus 5.2 4.8 –10.0
Shapley 3.9 5.5 –9.4
Nash 11.9 –2.7 –9.2An Application of C-Games 33
This case study points out one possible weakness of the cooperative agree-
ment—the coastal states can have clear incentives not to participate in it. If this hap-
pens, it may also represent a threat to the sustainable management of the resource,
as the stock will be depleted in the long run.
This problem does not emerge in the theoretical frameworks developed by Li
(1998) and Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), as each player loses by defecting from the
grand coalition and adopting a noncooperative strategy. In the applied setting devel-
oped herein, some of the players gain by defecting the cooperative agreement, al-
though it is assumed that the others react by choosing a strategy that maximizes its
payoff. In fact, this is a typical problem faced by cooperative agreements in the
presence of significant economic rents.
This applied work can be extended in several ways. First, expanding the calcu-
lation of the sharing rules for n players is a straightforward exercise, although one
requiring the simulation of all possible coalitions. In addition, the inter-temporal
consistency of the sharing rules needs to be considered. In fact, the coalition’s opti-
mal strategies may change as the stock recovers, and this can create additional
sources of instability for the cooperative solution. Furthermore, in the UN Agree-
ment there is scope for new entrants; that is, new countries that want to participate
in the fishery. The analysis of the proposed solutions in the context of new entrants
is, thus, a very relevant extension.
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N No. of fish (beginning of year) M Instantaneous natural mortality
Ñ Estimated no. fish (beginning of 1995) Mat Maturity rate
SRR Stock recruitment relation W Average weight
SSB Spawning stock biomass q Production function parameter
F Instantaneous fishing mortality α Catch-stock elasticity
FMax Fishing mort. at maximum selectivity wg Costs parameter
B Total biomass γ Crew share
Sel Selectivity r Interest rate
CN Catch numbers β Effort adjustment parameter
CB Catch biomass Π b Profit bound
E Effort h Exit condition parameter
C Catch sh Share on the gear catch
Rev Revenue m Number of players
Cost Cost
P Average price Indices
π Profit p Player (EU, OCS, DWFN, …)
TNPV Total net present value j Stock (j=East Atl., West Atl.)
t Time (t=1,…,T), T=25 (2020)
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Table A3
Shares of Catches by Gear—Base Year (1995)
East Atlantic West Atlantic
Gears EU OCS DWFN USA CAN DWFN
Longline 0.22 0.19 0.59 0.16 0.01 0.83
Purse seine 0.78 0.22 0 1.00 0 0
Trap 0.57 0.43 0 – – –
Bait boat 1 0 0 – – –
Rod and reel – – – 0.81 0.19 0
Remainder 0.74 0.26 0 0.28 0.72 0
Table A2
Economic Parameters of the Model
East Atlantic West Atlantic
Prices Unit of Prices Unit of
Gears (USD/kg) β wg Effort (USD/kg) β wg Effort
Longline 17  0.25 14,102 Fishing days 17 0.1 15,265 Fishing days
Purse seine 9 0.1 45,185* Fishing days 18 0.1 20,092 Days at sea
Trap 25 0.2 15,738 Trap days – – – –
Bait boat 5 0.2 4,638 Days at sea – – – –
Rod and reel – – – 18 0.1 163 Fishing hours
Remainder 17 0.01 2,408 Days at sea 20 0.1 22,417 Fishing days
* Note that for the PS, in the East Atlantic, one fishing day corresponds to more than three days at sea.